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EVIDENCE-CRIMINAL LAw-Cnoss-EXAMINATION OF AccusED's CHARACT.ER
WITNEss CoNCERNING AccusED's Pmon AmmsT-On trial in a district court for
bribing a federal revenue agent, defendant called five witnesses to testify to his good
reputation. During cross-examination by the district attorney, the character witnesses were asked: ''Did you ever hear that on October 11, 1920, the defendant
was arrested for 'receiving stolen goods?" The trial judge overruled the objection
to the question, and the witnesses answered in the negative. The prosecutor exhibited a paper record of this arrest to the court. The judge instructed the jury
that the question was to test the standard of the character evidence only, not to
establish the incident of arrest as a fact affecting the probability of defendant's
guilt. On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, following affirmance by
the circuit court of appe3;ls1 held, affirmed. Michelson v. United States, (U.S.
1948) 69 S.Ct. 213.
It is now well established that the state may not initially attack the accused's
character2 despite the general relevancy of bad character to the commission of
crime.3 Although the defendant may introduce his character in issue, he may do
this only by evidence of his reputation, and not by the opinion of witnesses or by
showing particular acts.4 The prosecution may then show the accused's bad character by rebutting witnesses, but is likewise limited to proof of character by reputation alone, and may not use evidence of particular acts.5 However, in addition,
the prosecution may cross-examine defendant's character witness concerning his
having heard rumors of specific acts of misconduct by the accused, the theory being
that the basis of his opinion as to character may be questioned. 6 The courts approving this rule temper its potentially disastrous effect on the accused by one or more
limitations: for example, by confining rumors of particular acts of the accused to
the trait of character in issue, 7 or by recognizing the trial judge's discretion to
(C.C.A. 2d, 1948) 165 F. (2d) 732.
"Character" is used in the sense of "disposition,'' or what the person actually is, while
"reputation," one method of proving character, is the estimation in which the person is held
in the community in which he lives. I WmMoRE, Evm:ENCE, 3d ed., § 52 (1940); 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, I Ith ed.,§ 332 (1935).
3 Greer v. United States, 245 U.S. 559, 38 S.Ct. 209 (1918); I WIGMORE, EVIDENCE,
3d ed., §§ 55-7 (1940).
4 WmMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §§ 52-4 (1940); 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE,
11th ed., § 331 (1935); 14 L.R.A. (n.s.) 689 (1907); cf. Edgington v. United States, 164
U.S. 361, 17 S.Ct. 72 (1896).
5 Peightel v. United States, (C.C.A. 8th, 1931) 49 F. (2d) 235; Hosier v. United States,
(C.C.A. 5th, 1933) 64 F. (2d) 657; Stewart v. United States, (App. D.C., 1939) 104 F.
(2d) 234; Josey v. United States, (App. D.C., 1943) 135 F. (2d) 809; 1 WmMoRE, EVIDENCE, 3d. ed., §§ 193-4 (1940); 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, 11th ed., § 337 (1935).
6 71 A.L.R. 1498 (1931); 15 Cm.-KENT REv. 220 (1937); see also: Lawrence v. United
States (C.C.A. 7th, 1932) 56 F. (2d) 555; Reuben v. United States, (C.C.A. 7th, 1936)
86 F. (2d) 464.
7This is sometimes said to be the Illinois rule. People v. Hannon, 381 ill. 206, 44 N.E.
(2d) 923 (1942); 71 A.L.R. 1498 (1931). But cf. People v. Page, 365 ill. 524, 6 N.E. (2d)
845 (1937); and 25 ILL. B.J. 335 (1937).
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deny the questions or demand good faith in their use, 8 or by requiring the judge
to instruct that the answers are a test of the witness' credibility only and do not
constitute proof of the rumored acts. 9 Assuming all these limitations are imposed
and granting that elimination of the rule would remove the only satisfactory test
of credibility of character witness, the jury's tendency is to disregard the theoretical
purpose of the question and to remember only the acts which were rumored. The
prosecution is thus given an unfair advantage, for the defendant has no chance to
explain or deny the rumors.10 The Supreme Court in the instant case admits the
cogency of arguments for abrogating this rule permitting cross-examination of
character witnesses as to rumors of particular acts of the accused. Nevertheless,
the Court confines itself to the "workable even if clumsy system" on the somewhat
questionable ground that a contrary decision would be more likely to"... upset
[the] present balance between adverse interests than to establish a rational edifice."11

C. C. Grunew~ld, S.Ed.

8 McBoyle v. United States (C.C.A. 10th, 1930) 43 F. (2d) 273; Mannix v. United
States (C.C.A. 4th, 1944) 140 F. (2d) 250; 71 A.L.R. 1541 (1931).
9 22 lowAL. Rllv. 583 (1937).
10 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., § 988 (1940); 15 Cm.-KENT Rllv. 220 (1937).
11 Princial case at-223.

